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THE PRESENT CHINA

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THE subject of the present China needs no apologist for its timeliness. While the European war has forcibly usurped popular attention, there are movements on foot in China, some antedating the war and some growing out of it, which are significant and prognostic. It is not for any one person to give a valid final judgment on the China of to-day, much less a rational prophecy of the near future. In this paper, therefore, it is not designed to make a complete study, but only more practically to discuss certain aspects of the present situation in China as viewed at first hand.

There are several cogent reasons why China to-day is vastly important to America. In the first place, America stands in a peculiar relation of guardianship. Not exercising any protectorate, the only great power not to force land concessions from China, America has at the same time brought moral pressure to bear which has created and so far guaranteed the open-door policy, and has saved China from partition or from an equally suicidal grant of special privileges to any one nation. The restoration of the Boxer indemnity by America, and its application to scholarships for Chinese students in America has furthered the influence of America's voice in Chinese affairs.

Again America stands in the relation of example. Since her own system is no longer efficient and since its inefficiency is becoming recognized even by herself, China has been turning, one might say, almost naturally to America as to the one great power which, being disinterested and having the excellence of western civilization, might therefore be taken as an example in her own reconstruction. But a pattern inherently connotes obligation. A collective or national obligation is with difficulty recognized individually. And America individually is lamentably far from recognizing her obligation as an example to China.

China is vastly important to America because of commercial opportunities. This too America realizes only in part. Here, as in other relations, the war has given America a rare opening which needs immediate improvement to be successful. Heretofore, for example, American cotton has been exported to England and the finished fabrics in English hands have found a ready market in China. There is no reason why America should not supply the finished product direct. The Standard Oil Company and the Singer Sewing Machine Company are conspicuous among the very few American business concerns which have a strong Chinese trade. Some of the lines which seem to have a special

opportunity at this time are men's clothing, clocks and watches, jewelry, pictures, groceries, especially tinned goods. There is an unusual field in China for the development of life-insurance business. The same holds true for drugs and chemicals. Japan is flooding China with cheap patent medicines and unscrupulous imitations of standard western drug specialties, and prepared food. The Chinese eagerly buy such articles because they are advertised as western and because western medicine has a high reputation with the people. If the American public, in spite of the educational campaign of the American Medical Association, and of numerous newspapers and magazines, is still unbelievably gullible in the matter of patent medicines and sure cures, small wonder indeed if the Chinese, with his ancestral regard for learning and belief in the truth of what is printed, should eagerly swallow any concoction if only it be properly advertised. But the legitimate drug and specialty business has a lucrative and valuable field in China, a field of education as well as of exploitation.

China is important to America because of the constant problem of oriental immigration. Discrimination in immigration restriction is neither just nor practical. Yet it certainly is most necessary to exclude coolie labor, whether it be Chinese, Japanese, Hindu or perhaps even Mexican. As has been said elsewhere,¹ the test of a desirable immigrant is his ability to amalgamate and become a true American. As a general thing this test excludes from the desirables the oriental coolie class. So far, no solution of the matter has been found. A so-called "gentleman's agreement" with Japan has worked probably because Japan wants every possible Japanese in Mongolia, Manchuria and China. Absolute restriction of the Hindus runs against the difficulty of their British citizenship. Yet Canada excludes them. Canada and Australia have this same problem. A new and frank immigration law is needed which shall establish a feasible and impartial basis of admission. At present and in the near future the Pacific immigration problem is of no small magnitude.

In an indirect way China is important to America because Japanese-American relations may conceivably be strongly influenced by the policy followed by America in China. This will be taken up in connection with Japan's present activity in China. The proposed release of the Philippines will bring into prominence Japan's attitude of menace or benevolence, according to the viewpoint, towards both the Philippines and Hawaii. It seems indisputable that Japanese desire for these island territories will be inversely proportional to her opportunity for colonization and exploitation in China. A policy on the part of America which limits Japan's intentions and desires in China

¹ "Immigration and the Public Health," *The Popular Science Monthly*, October, 1913.

may therefore easily reflect those intentions in more concentrated form toward the Philippines and Hawaii.

In the present chaotic condition of internal affairs in China it is manifestly impossible to give any clear idea of what is really happening, and much less as to what may or is about to happen. A few items, however, stand out with reasonable clearness either because they are in more or less historical perspective already or because they are what might be called Chinese principles of politics. Political life in China is and always has been apparently characterized by excessive graft together with what is perhaps the truest democracy on a large scale that the world has seen. For China has given to her sons equal opportunity for advancement and moreover has made their political advancement dependent on intellectual attainment. This may not be so admirable in practise as in theory, but that is no fault of the theory. Here as always they are fond of paper reforms and platitudinous platforms which express lofty and eminently correct sentiments and which the least of them has no real intention of carrying out. The few men in China who have honestly attempted to put the paper reforms into concrete terms have stood out as heroes, to be sure, but have usually been effectively and promptly squelched.

The omnipresent and customary graft is one of the greatest evils in Chinese politics as it is perhaps the hardest to uproot. It is to be reckoned with everywhere and always, and even to a greater extent than in our own fair land.

The present political situation revolves about the struggle to introduce republican principles and a democratic electorate. To condense the exposition it may be said that the desirability of a republic in China is far from proved. Any government to be successful must be an evolution and not an importation. China's proper government must be worked out from her own history and present needs and the experience of other countries must not receive too much weight because their problems are essentially different. The average Chinese is not interested in public life, nor has he until very lately had even a sentiment of patriotism. Even now this latter is a puny thing and conditions must change considerably before China will be able to want or demand a representative government. It is questionable, moreover, whether such a government is best suited to Chinese or even oriental interests. Considering the nature of the people and their history in the light of their present economic status, a limited monarchy administered with a strong hand and insuring centralized authority and personal security with eradication of the all-prevalent graft, seems to offer the best solution.

Turning briefly to China's political relations at present, the most important for herself and the world is of course her foreign relations.

More, perhaps, than in any other country do foreign nations control her destiny. As she does to-day, China has always referred to herself as the middle kingdom, and all other nations have been barbarian to her and semi-civilized. But she has been brought along the hard path of experience to see that her very corporate existence is dependent on others than herself. In the effort to save herself she has elaborated the famous policy of playing one opponent off against another to her own advantage or more often to a simple postponement of the day of reckoning. China's relations with foreign powers have been far from convincing her that their desires are for her own good. In the old legends of the land, the devils were conceived as pale fierce beings of large size and malevolent action. Then the foreigner came along and systematically lived up to that same picture. He earned for himself the title which has persisted, of "foreign devil." As China knows to her sorrow, such he has too often been.

First among the nations with which China is concerned is to be noted Japan. Here is a long and contradictory story running back even to the time when Japan took her letters and arts bodily from China. The same process is seen in Japan to-day, and not only China, but also other nations are the losers. Robbed of the fruits of her victory over Russia, Japan has perforce had to wait the day and the strength to reach her goal on the mainland of Asia. That day seemed to have come with the European conflagration, and she at once declared war on Germany and took possession of the well-developed district of Kiaochow. The English helped with the actual occupation, but for their pains received only a contumelious eviction as soon as the eyes of the world were turned back to Europe. Having her three great allies and, as she well knows, her three potential enemies, England, France and Russia, more than occupied at home, and their attention and arms withdrawn from far Asia, Japan proceeded to put into execution a bold and barefaced robbery at the point of the bayonet of what China alone could not adequately defend. Having no other antagonists to play off against her, China could only protest and, as gracefully as possible, submit to the usurpation of her political and industrial if not even of her territorial integrity. The demands by Japan in the early months of 1915 attracted some attention at Washington and drew a response in no uncertain terms. In its note to the governments of China and Japan, the United States government said, "that it (the American government) can not recognize any agreement or undertaking which has been entered into or which may be entered into between the governments of China and Japan impairing the treaty rights of the United States and its citizens in China, the political or territorial integrity of the Republic of China or the international policy relative to China, commonly known as the Open-Door Policy."

When she extirpated the Germans from Shantung, Japan stated unequivocally that the act was a temporary measure alone and that it was merely preliminary to the restoration of Kiaochow to the sovereignty of China. Having effected her occupation this worthy purpose grew dim in the expressions of Japanese policy, and she now subscribes herself without a blush and with full assumption of justification as the successor to all the rights of Germany in Shantung. A mere recital of the demands made upon China by Japan is enough to prove our contention, particularly if the treaty relations between Japan and America, and between Japan and England, be kept in mind, as also the fact that these demands were made secretly and after withdrawal of one group following the American note, at the point of the bayonet. Japanese troops were sent into China and the direst consequences were threatened if China did not accede by the expiration of the ultimatum delivered at three in the afternoon of May 7, 1915, and which expired at six on the afternoon of May 9.

The first group of demands concerned the transfer to Japan of all German rights and influence in Shantung, with right to construct a new railroad and to prevent the entrance of any third power into this province. Group two required recognition of a specially favored position for Japan in South Manchuria and eastern Inner Mongolia. The third group looked to the eventual control of the Han-Yeh-Ping steel company by the Japanese and the exclusion of other nations from mining privilege in the general district of these mines. Group four agrees "that no island port or harbor along the coast shall be ceded or leased to any third power." Group five provided for the employment in the Chinese government of influential Japanese advisers in political, financial and military affairs, for the right of Japanese to police certain cities in China, number and names not specified, for special and exclusive privileges of railroad and other development in the province of Fukien and for the purchase or manufacture in Japan of a majority of war munitions needed for Chinese arms. The net result of these demands would be to make China a protectorate of Japan, destroying her own sovereignty and at the same time excluding all other nations eventually from developmental and industrial rights in China.

In return for all these concessions not one item of advantage for China appears, but all redounds to the very evident advantage of Japan. Certain of the demands were dropped after receipt of the American note and protests from European powers. Japan now occupies a very critical position both for herself and for China. What will follow the settlement of the European war is as yet hidden in the future, but Japan will doubtless not be left alone in her effort to Indianize China. While her hands and people are full with their present expansion in China, there is of course no probable chance for Japanese interests to require

hostility to the United States. When she is limited in her Chinese campaign and especially if the United States takes a hand in the limitation along with the other powers, it is logical to suppose that the United States will have reason to look carefully to her own Pacific coast and island possessions. If the judgment is to rest on what she has done in the near past, then the one consideration which will move Japan is her own interest and when that runs athwart the United States, let the United States defend herself.

It is said with truth that the Japanese administration of Korea has resulted in marked economic, industrial and social improvement in that country. It is added that similar administration of China as desired by Japan would be a similar advantage. This is, however, only one side of the question, and ignores the inherent right of any race or nation to work out their own development if they can. A Japanized China is not the ideal wanted by the Chinese, who have racial pride and ambition. If Japan gave any assurance that her rule in China would redound primarily to the benefit of the Chinese the position might be more tenable. At present it is not even plausible. If China will do as she has attempted to do in the matter of reconstruction and social development of her people, she has a right to work out her own lines of advance as well as her own government.

So far America alone among the nations has shown any disinterested regard for China. America alone has not assisted at forcing the principle of extra-territoriality on China. America has won a tremendous influence in China and for the taking can have a wonderful trade and industrial expansion in China, and this expansion will be under the control of the Chinese and will not limit their sovereignty or national integrity. So soon as China can produce a generation of strong high-principled men, of whom she has now all too few, so soon will she prove her ability to conduct her affairs with credit to herself and benefit to her citizens. She needs advice and assistance from foreign nations, but she does not need foreign aggression and rule. If such a generation can but be achieved, before her weakness is too far exploited by Japan, she will rule in her own land with justice and power. And the same applies to the European powers as to Japan.

A review of economic conditions in China which shall be given with comprehensive accuracy, would require a volume. In discussing it, however briefly, the point of view must be that the Chinese are essentially a secular race, lacking in the introspective contemplative traits of India and inclined rather to matter-of-fact, prosaic, tangible matters. The Chinese are industrious and minutely absorbed in the common daily round. As a race they have no outlook, no hope for the future, no interest beyond the very natural desire to secure enough rice for one more day.

The population of China is by common agreement fixed at four hundred millions. This figure rests on a singular absence of definite data. A really careful head census taken by the police in Changsha in 1913 gives some light on the subject. The population of Changsha had been estimated at from three hundred to five hundred thousand. The police census showed 270,000. It is probable that in country districts the discrepancy between estimated and counted population would be even greater. Judging from the opinions of various foreigners widely traveled in China, the ordinary estimates would be reduced to about two thirds. It is not possible here to go into extended details regarding the population of China, but there is good reason for assuming that the actual figures are not more than two thirds those usually stated.

Another common conception which does not well bear close inspection is that China is grossly over-populated. If the available possibilities of adequate forestation were developed, new industries connected with lumber supply and utilization would populate large districts now unused. So too manufacturing and factory development would employ and support a large new population. The development of water power and of the large and practically untouched mineral resources of the land, and the extension of modern means of transportation, would provide vast new employment and make possible a much denser population. There are extensive tracts of rich bottom land along the great rivers which, because they are subject to periodical overflow, are not now available for cultivation. Forestation plus reclamation works will open these to settlement. Even vaster tracts are not utilizable because of their aridity. Here irrigation projects or dry farming or such industries as stock raising await introduction. Although the Chinese farmer understands the rotation of crops and is an intensive expert, still even here is room for improvement and often rice land could be planted to corn, and its food production increased several fold. These are but the more obvious lines which will combine to make possible a vastly greater self-supporting population.

Even the passing traveler in China is impressed with the all-enveloping and well-nigh universal poverty. In the police census of Changsha the total population by count was 270,604, including 583 foreigners. Of these 52,744 were classed as extremely poor, requiring some help from the government practically all the time to prevent actual starvation. An additional 67,687 were classed as moderately poor, requiring government aid in such emergencies as flood, short crops and drouth to prevent starvation. These two classes combined represent 44 per cent. of the total population which regularly each year requires some aid to avoid starvation. And Changsha is among China's richest, most powerful and most cultured cities.

No small contributor to China's economic problems is her woeful

lack of inter-communication. Each district is more or less isolated and insulated. Only now and in the larger cities are telegraphs, telephones and newspapers seen. Traffic and commercial exchange are limited. This with the exceeding poor development of her natural resources keeps China poor, makes even the present population excessive under present conditions, and forms a vicious economic and social circle by interacting with her monetary system and lack of national stamina.

Wages are cheap, of course, but human life and labor are cheaper. Life has a fairly definite monetary value and is vastly cheaper than such western inventions as machinery, sanitation and efficient methods. There is no argument appealing to the Chinese for change when human life and labor do the work of, and cost less than, machinery. China is characterized by the lack of a genuine monetary system. Reform of the present hodge-podge of standards, exchange and discounts is always bitterly opposed by the banks and swarming cash shops which fatten off the present agglomeration of exchanges and monetary standards.

For the Chinese China is a land of tremendous insecurity of life, property and savings. It is difficult for a foreigner to appreciate how extreme is this insecurity. Life is menaced by unrestricted disease, epidemic, endemic and constitutional. There is small protection against accident, calamity, public and private foes. Property is menaced by inexactness of title, uncertainty of tenure, public accident and calamity without redress, and by the changeableness of political conditions. Insurance is a new item which for the average Chinese as yet has no existence. He patronizes all religions with careful impartiality, half consciously hoping somehow to safeguard himself and his property. His religious zeal, which frequently embraces Mohammedanism, Taoism, Buddhism and Confucianism, and too often Christianity at the same valuation is apt to be a mere form of fire insurance, with no hope other than that, if there be opportunity to escape calamity, he may perchance by this means find it.

The psychology of the Chinese is yet to be written. Such a work based on careful laboratory studies of reactions and manner of thought, would doubtless go far to dissipate the idea that the Chinese are essentially different from other people. Kipling says the obvious thing when he states:

Oh east is east and west is west, and never the twain shall meet,
Till earth and sky stand presently at God's great judgment seat.

But he goes further and says the true thing when he completes the stanza:

But there is neither east nor west, border nor breed nor birth,
When two strong men stand face to face, tho' they come from the ends of the earth.

So too there is but a temporary and partial truth in Kipling's further words, when he says:

Now it is not well for the Christian to hustle the Aryan brown,
For the Christian riles and the Aryan smiles, and he beareth the Christian down.
And the end of the fight is a tombstone white, with the name of the late deceased
And the epitaph drear, A fool lies here, Who tried to hustle the east.

The east can be hustled and the Aryan does not always smile, and there is a common meeting ground which is advantageous to both. The Chinese are very much like other people, and that they seem different at first contact often reflects merely the greater real difference of their investigators. They have the same emotions, the same joys and sorrows, and the same instinctive dislike and suspicion of what is foreign. Under the same environment conditions, or in response to the same direct stimuli, their primitive reactions are the same as those of western people. We can see mirrored in them our own mental processes and intuitive reasonings. They are more adept than we in concealing certain emotions and therefore have justly earned the sobriquet of bland and childlike. Yet in other things where we are blasé and sophisticated and indifferent, they are alert, eager and frankly interested. Few of the traits or epithets which we so jauntily and even superciliously fasten upon the Chinese, can not with equal or greater justice be applied to ourselves. It is simply a matter of hereditary perspective.

Assuming without detailed comparison that the difference is a separation in degree and not in kind, in externals and not in essentials, in practical application of principles and not in fundamental methods of thought or action, let us see in more specific fashion in what this difference consists. To understand the Chinese, one must understand their heredity and their environment. The latter can never be understandable except through personal contact, and the former may only be approached through the latter. Had we been born under like conditions and surroundings, our ways would be their ways. To have some understanding of these determinative factors, is to see how logically they act and how characteristically they react. If it is true for us that under the circumstances existing at a certain moment, a man *can* act only as he *does* act, it is much more true of the Chinese, with whom the power of tradition and custom to control action and thought is nearly absolute.

It is hard to appreciate the complete isolation of the life of the average Chinese. The coolie and the farmer to a particular degree, as well as their countrymen of more education and wealth, lead a life remarkable for its narrowness and insulation. Lack of community interest and poor means of local and general communication increase this condition. The man is content to pursue his own little individual daily round doing the same trivial things over with monotonous repeti-

tion as his father did them before him, never seeing ahead of his nose and having his nose effectually buried in the depths of monotony and covered over with the paralyzing weight of custom. His little horizon is narrowly circumscribed by his daily occupation and his constant struggle to get enough rice for to-morrow. Further than that he does not look, nor does he want any extension of his interests or limitations. He is busy, satisfied and smugly convinced that what has been always will be, and that no improvement is possible or necessary. In fact he can not and does not recognize the constriction of his own interests and personality. So acute is his struggle for actual life and so narrow the margin of safety from actual starvation, that he has no outlook beyond his own little plodding zone. He has no newspapers and no means of knowing what is going on in the world or in China or in his own province and city. Moreover, the average farmer and coolie can not read. There are no libraries or other means of diffusing knowledge. Even inter-communication by travel has made but little headway, and so we find the average Chinese shut into a monotonous round, with few holidays, no Sundays, and very rare breaks in the unchanging routine. Here is provincialism at its acme.

With this narrow and limited outlook on life, it is small wonder that superstition flourishes and that the spirit world should assume influential dimensions. The throngs of pursuing devils are always malevolent, always require appeasing and are very uncritically regarded by the people. The streets are always crooked with many sharp turns and jogs because the evil spirits proceed only in straight lines and thus can not follow one far along the street. So too the numerous gates through which one must always have an indirect approach to houses serve the same function. And the gods of the gate—those two famous old generals, Hah and Hoong, who once saved their monarch from the onslaught of a hundred thousand devils, and therefore can do the same for every household. It never occurs to the Chinese to consider whether his neighbor who neglects these observances fares better, worse or the same, at the hands of the spirits. No, here as always he is uncritical and accepts implicitly the apparent authority of tradition and custom. Not his to question, but in his characteristic matter-of-fact way, he will follow all the superstitious observances of his fathers with unquestioning faith—or indifference.

The boatman paints eyes on the bow of his craft because without eyes no creature can see. At every turn the all-powerful geomancers are consulted and by their curious processes of divination are decided favorable times and places for burial, building, wedding, journey or any other matter under consideration. If no auspicious place of interment is available or if the dragon of the earth is sulky, the deceased will be kept as a member of the household, it may be for several

years. Parenthetically it may be said that the dead are placed in huge coffins constructed of thick logs with planed sides, and after addition of quick lime the heavy lid is fitted tightly on. Such a sarcophagus may often be seen, serving as bed or table for the family until the geomancers find the season and locality which are favorable.

Every Chinese city of consequence has in the course of its years accumulated one or several pagodas which have become a typical feature of Chinese architecture. The pagoda has various explanations, but none perhaps better than that it constitutes a structure devoid of human use and intended to ward off from the city or village the baneful influence of the dragon of the air or earth. The pagoda is set in a commanding location. It has no means of ingress, sometimes indeed is built solid. How it acts no man can say, but as people even in America are not prone to defend their superstitions, so the Chinese is willing to let explanations go and assumes tacitly that like the great black arts of geomancy, this thing too is necessary for his peace and happiness.

When in 1914 the first aeroplane was about to fly from Hankow, 200 miles up to Changsha, it was necessary for the governor of Hunan Province to issue educational posters and a proclamation warning the people of the nature of this new thing and explaining that it was not the dragon of the air or an adumbration of pursuant calamity. Otherwise riots and far-reaching disorders might have arisen.

A native funeral, decked in white and carrying a parade of images of houses, men and animals, is a strange and bizarre spectacle. Then at the grave the paper and bamboo effigies are burned and furnish the deceased with property and equipment for his further adventures. Yet the canny Chinese does not burn money or houses. He unthinkingly assumes that the spirit world will be as well off for the burning of imitations, as doubtless it will. We are amused and yet the publican and the Pharisee have many an illustration in these United States. We need go back in decades only to count over the superstitions which reigned in western lands, and, even more, we find them yet. And among our most cultured and clear-thinking selves, have we raised up many phobias, and imperative fears and prepossessions which are not after all much different or more desirable than the uncritical practical superstition which rules the ordinary life of the Chinese.

It follows immediately upon their insularity and superstition that the Chinese are hyper-suspicious of all strange and new things. In this too they do not differ from western peoples. One morning an American in Changsha noted a great uproar in the street in front of his compound. On investigating, he was astonished to find a squad of police guarding his gate, all traffic stopped and the large crowd kept well back by the police. In response to his inquiry the police pointed

out a small round object lying in the street in front of the gate. It was different from anything known to them and they believed it some sort of deadly explosive designed for the destruction of the foreigner. With a guilty conscience and despite the protestation of the police, the American gentleman picked up the round object, which was a wornout atomizer bulb thoughtlessly thrown into the street the night before.

It is hard to differentiate much or most of the religion of the people from superstition. The omnipresent spirits are strangely always considered evil. Cats are held in superstitious regard and great esteem. Even yet, is it widely believed that the foreign doctor uses eyes and other organs for his medicines. Not long ago a curious group of guests, after having been taken on a sight-seeing tour through the home of a newly arrived missionary in Hunan, asked particularly to see the eyes and hearts in the covered jars in the food cellar. In spite of their excessive suspicion of all that is new and strange, a trait which incidentally is purely instinctive, they have never sought voluntarily to replace superstition by knowledge in a systematic fashion.

Closely allied to their ultra-suspicion is their ultra-curiosity. Most races except the more blasé exponents of western civilization, show great curiosity regarding foreign races. The Chinese even exceeds in this.

Their sense of humor is likewise highly developed. Laughter is never far distant and a joke on themselves is always appreciated—at least by their fellows. It is always easy to get a street crowd laughing. Little things amuse them. They are usually cheerful and happy and impress one as being content. The divine seed of discontent in fact has been smothered by their isolation and ignorance. Yet they are a laughter-loving race and it takes but little to arouse this healthy propensity.

By iteration it has grown into the western Chinese tradition that the Chinese are less sensitive to pain than western races and that their passivity and oriental slowness endow them with a nervous system different from ours in its manner of action. Such, however, is not the experience of all who have worked medically in China. They are keenly sensitive to pain and are even more appreciative of its relief than westerners, because they have no expectation of relief, and therefore appreciate it more highly. Chinese medicine has no provision for controlling hemorrhage or pain except with opium. This, with a total absence of knowledge concerning bacteria and sepsis, has made surgery impossible and has retarded the development even of an empirical medical practise. Centuries of acclimatization to suffering, however, may lead to a stoical endurance and continued expectation of suffering. And such we find. But the quick and impulsive appre-

ciation and gratitude when pain is relieved or prevented, effectually routs the idea that the Chinese has a decreased sensitivity to pain.

This brings up the question of the nature of the stoical and indifferent endurance of the Chinese race—of their lethargic inertia and apathetic acquiescence in whatever is. It is to this quality that they owe their racial preservation and integrity. It is their chief asset of strength as in it is their greatest potential fault. This it is which has time after time made them conquer their conquerors. This it is, either cause or result, which can not be dissociated from their history, their system of education and their characteristic reactionism. Yet, as has been described, when one studies the Chinese closely, he finds him quick to see humor, emotional, sensitive, reacting to stimuli much as a western man with similar environment and inheritance. In medical work among the Chinese we find neuroses, functional insanities, hysteria and minor psychoses equally or even more common than in America.

It seems that the Chinese typically has a higher threshold of stimulation than the occidental. It takes a larger summation of stimuli or a greater single stimulus in the first place to rise into consciousness and in the second place to cause reflex activity. So we see him impervious to noises, odors and sights which western nerves bear but poorly. We see him existing with no complaint and no idea of betterment in squalor, misery and poverty, which western personality would find at once unendurable. We see him exercise a fatalistic indifference to the immediate or remote future, because no clear picture has risen into his consciousness of any condition or time different from his own immediate present. When the summation or single stimulus is sufficiently great, however, for sensation to appear in consciousness, there is but a narrow margin of normal response before the reaction becomes pathological. Hence it is that all the psychoses and neuroses are so easily aroused, since the zone of normal response is narrowed by the high threshold of stimulation. Thus we see the superficial anomaly of sluggishness, inertia and indifference associated with a high and poorly controlled emotional nature which involves and easily goes over into hysteria and various emotional crises. One must indeed pause to consider the result of the impact of the hurrying din of western civilization on a racial mentality so constructed, unless indeed, as seems likely, this very inertia will rise as an instinctive protective reflex and modify the intensity of the impact by distributing it over several generations.

The Chinese are essentially, first, last and always, a peaceful and timid people. They do not take kindly to militarism and their ideals are not ideals of martial prowess or physical valor. Their invasions have been peaceful, unobtrusive and correspondingly effective. They match industry, endurance and a low value of life and living against

the sword, the intellectual pride and the standard of achievement of the west, and they win out. They do not wish to be an army, and the present effort to arouse popular admiration for the army goes counter to the ancient prejudice, which put soldiers absolutely at the bottom of the social ladder.

When White Wolf and his bandits were operating in northern Hupeh, there was great fear and excitement in Changsha, some 300 miles south, and this despite 3,000 well armed police and 3,000 northern troops and a populace of near 300,000. But the gates were doubly barred at sundown, strict search was made of every sedan chair and rickshaw entering the city, and altogether this distant and rumor-magnified bandit became a terror to one of the first cities of China.

Illustration alike of Chinese reasoning and war-instinct is found in the story told of the northern general commanding Nanking at the time of the first revolution. Nanking is situated in the hollow of a sweeping curve of the Yangtze Kiang and on the river side is sheltered and dominated by a line of low hills. The defense of these hills made them well-nigh impregnable to assault from the water way. The revolutionists accordingly landed beyond the hills and attacked the undefended rear of the city. This was entirely unforeseen by the commanding general, who promptly surrendered, saying there was no use in opposing men who took such unfair advantage and who insisted on fighting in a fashion and on a front for which he was not prepared.

But the unwarlike habit of the Chinese extends likewise to his personal relations. A domestic or street imbroglio is frequent, perhaps because of its safety. The combatants never come to blows. They may occasionally scratch or tear the hair, and their attitude and gestures will be most menacing. Yet nothing is less desired than to injure the opponent. To terrify him and make him lose face is the great object. Thus too did the old-time soldiers put on tiger skins and paint frightful figures on themselves and on their banners. The private combatants too make use greatly of judicious cursing, starting with their opponent and carrying the matter back through preceding generations to primeval times. A certain unscrupulous foreigner was wont to receive marked attention and deference from his servants by the stratagem of reciting the English alphabet with proper tone and gesture. The effect was edifying as the procedure seemed to smack of strange and powerful foreign curses, which to unaccustomed Chinese ears had portentous meaning. One never forgets such an example as a street ragamuffin meeting a distinguished and handsomely attired old scholar and incurring his wrath by some cosmopolitan trick known to the freemasonry of youth. Then the gamin and the scholar go each on his several way, each in turn at the top of his lungs imprecating the other to the original generation, and calling down on him the wrath of devils and men impartially.

They are indeed a peculiar people, these celestials, and, granting them their true apportionment of the homogeneity of the human race, yet the expression and the practise of it differ amazingly. Put a man under the Roentgen screen, and his appearance takes on a startling caricature of that same appearance in the light of day. So the oriental and Chinese illumination of human nature differs strikingly from the occidental. Thus the Chinese puts on his hat and tips his spectacles as a mark of respect or recognition. He bows in a really graceful attitude and shakes his own hands. He mourns in white, and red is his wedding color. His men wear skirts and his women trousers. The latter bind their feet instead of their waists. The men substitute for what Professor Ross calls the "diaphragmatic bellow of western males," a thin nasal falsetto singing voice.

The coolie uses a mattock and basket instead of a shovel. He pushes what we pull, and from antiquity has used the principle of the wheel, inclined plane, endless chain, water wheel and lathe. We are taking back to their originator our spectacles, printing, gunpowder, compasses, and numerous mechanical inventions. He has not and does not improve on the original methods and the primeval ideas may be observed to-day as laboriously followed out in the descent of generations.

The Chinese is just as antithetical in his mental as in his physical processes. He sees things in a different light from what we do, and his process of reasoning seems often to come out by the same door at which it went in. Still it serves him to live by.

Being oriental, the Chinese has a wonderful gift of color and music unrelieved by the softening influence of perspective, spectral relationships of color, shades or physical harmony of sound waves. He outcubes the cubists, and his dissonances, minors and falsettos are at once the despair, the malediction and the envy of western artists. The flute or wandering violin of the blind beggar becomes, with its simple and truly plaintive minor phrase, emblematic to the appreciative ear of the unconscious or subconscious racial longing for something which their history, their religion and their society have failed to give them. The chant of the drilling soldiers as toward sundown they join strongly in the new national hymn, rises with peculiar beauty and with peculiar pathos among the old hills and graves, the mud houses and ancient walls, the lethargy and prosaic level, both spiritual and physical, of the surrounding country-side. One hears this chant rising and falling with the wind, sung full-lunged and with abandon, and it sets the blood atingle with a wonder as to what the Chinese giant will really be and do when he really awakes.

Many features of Chinese social life have been dwelt on to the point of familiarity by many observers of it. The peculiar food customs,

habits, language and family organization are well known. The subservient position of women and its evil results on society have been dwelt on repeatedly. The respect for age and the authority of tradition are two potent causes for China's standstill, and themselves result most likely from her unique educational system, in turn a product and corollary of Confucianism. All endeavor and thought is concerned with the past rather than the future. This is coupled with a typical resignation to existing circumstances which, because they have long existed, does not recognize that they can change.

After all, the real interest of the Chinese for us lies in their seeming strangeness and our ignorance of their characteristics. And the essential problem, after all, to which all other problems are ancillary, the vital problem which actually innervates and pervades all our speculation and curiosity, is easily and simply stated. Is the oriental type of civilization more to be desired than the western, and when the two come into competition, which will win in the long run? Made specific, we seek to find those essential factors in the Chinese, and to deduce these from all available data of him and his ways, which shall explain to us precisely where, when and how he may become a dangerous competitor in any line of our activity. To eliminate race prejudice from such consideration is next to impossible. And yet prejudice *per se* is no evil thing. For, if it is based on just and true convictions, it is the prime necessity for moral strength in man or nation.

If then race prejudice is, as we believe, an instinctive racial protective reflex looking to the preservation of the race, and with it all of its ideals and contribution to human life, then is it a good thing and we are justified in our prejudice as the Chinese is in his. This view in no wise antagonizes the fullest expression of altruism and human interchange of wares, ideas and civilization. It says flatly: "America for Americans and China for the Chinese." Let the Chinese work out their own salvation, as they must of necessity do if they are to be saved by it. Let the west teach them western ethics, western science, western religion. But let not the strong and good elements of either civilization blot out the other until that other people shall consciously decide to change.

What then is the special element in the Chinese which arouses this strong prejudice in the western mind and is there just reason for the prejudice? This element is without doubt the enduring indomitable vitality of the Chinese race. We express it when we say that the Chinese laborer can under-live the Caucasian laborer. It is to be traced running like a thread through all the maze of Chinese characteristics. If eight out of ten Chinese infants die where three out of ten western infants die, then, as Professor Ross points out, the destruction of the weaker on such a scale must perforce mean the constant survival of a stronger, more vigorous stock, and this process continuing through centuries must give a rare racial vitality.

But this only tells one side of the story, and on close observation even the smaller side. We must remember as a corollary that while the strongest of each generation will live, they will be weakened by the struggle, and the acquired weaknesses will have the same tendency to hereditary perpetuation, as the inherent hereditary strength. Thus we are or may be reasoning in a circle. The argument of Professor Ross thus misses by far the force of a syllogism. Then too, granting a possible measure of truth in this position, the question is most apposite, is the endowment of racial vitality attained worth the ruthless sacrifice entailed, and here again we are squarely up against the relative merits of eastern and western civilization.

But it is possible that a different emphasis will reveal a more potent cause for the physical vitality of the Chinese. This too is noted by Professor Ross. The centuries of constant exposure to infectious agents have no doubt brought a gradual racial immunization to disease poisons with a consequent vitality which is not possessed by other races under like conditions. We have of course many common illustrations of such racial immunization. The attenuation of the virulence of epidemic disease and its storage in as yet ill-defined reservoirs until a less resistant generation shall permit its re-extension, is illustrated by the great waves of plague which have inundated the earth periodically. The resistance to tuberculosis of those habituated to its presence is evidently not shared by the Esquimaux and South Sea islanders. Immunity to mosquito and vermin bites which comes from long habituation is another of innumerable cases in point.

We have however to compare the Chinese vitality with our own, for example, and to continue the reasoning of relative racial immunization to disease as well as to unsanitary and low-scale living. Tuberculosis is the greatest disease plague of China, as it is one of the greatest in the west. Next to tuberculosis rank the venereal diseases. Closely following are the parasitic water-borne diseases as the typhoids, dysenteries and cholera. It is hard indeed to trace any acquired or inherited lack of susceptibility to these in the Chinese. They are undoubtedly as common if not more common than in the west. In fact, practically all of our western diseases flourish luxuriantly in China and usually claim a mortality higher than with us. China also has many diseases which are not found to any extent in the west. These are bald statements, but are based on a short experience and a longer study of available data and can only be refuted by such exact and controlled investigations as have not yet been made.

It is commonly said that diabetes is unknown in China, yet a recent incomplete investigation brought to light over 200 cases. Nervous diseases are accounted rare among the Chinese, yet even a short experience has shown their incidence, at least in Changsha, to be as great or greater

than in this country. The idea of easy child-birth and freedom from puerperal and post-partum infection is contrary to much experience and certainly is not supported by the Chinese aphorism that a woman in labor has one foot in the grave. The group of neuroses, functional digestive disorders, gastric and duodenal ulcer, malignant, nutritional and constitutional diseases, are without doubt vastly more prevalent in China than accredited to be. So we might go through the list. The point of the matter is this. We must challenge every statement of a superior racial vitality in the Chinese on the ground of superior resistance to disease, until such time as demonstrable scientific proof and controlled statistics are presented in its favor.

In determining any unknown proposition, we are safest in assuming the most probable explanation, in using analogies from our own experience, and further in checking our hypotheses by careful first-hand impartial observation.

Two points further must be briefly sketched before we can arrive at a conclusion of the matter. In the first place it is illogical and misleading to consider the Chinese a unit when we observe the influence of physical characteristics on their racial vitality. The overwhelming bulk of western medical experience with the Chinese has been with the rank and file of the coolie and farmer class who represent the lowest stratum of Chinese living, moral and spiritual as well as physical. Their existence is a mere vegetation and no accurate data are to be drawn from comparing their properties and characteristics with average western properties and characteristics. The two races must be compared class by class and the highest with the highest and not with the lowest. The European peasant or American miner will show the same stolidity, indifference and insensibility as the Chinese farmer. Medical experience with the different races coming to Ellis Island shows a surprising parallel to similar experience with various strata of Chinese society. The subject is large and needs elaboration. Here it can only be recommended for considerative development.

The second point to be remembered, while it does not concern directly our judgment on the question of racial vitality, yet bears much on our estimate of the Chinese. A strenuous competition for survival may be granted for argument's sake to improve the racial stock, though this is not conceded. Still, granting that it does, by the same rule it may well draw so largely on the last reserves of physical strength as to leave neither strength nor ambition for spiritual or moral development. In other words, we may consider that the Chinese has such a time of it supporting mere physical vegetative existence that he has won his increased stamina and ability to endure adverse conditions of hygiene and society, at the expense of his actual ability to raise his mental and moral level. This is what we actually see in China where the struggle for

existence has obviously crowded out too often the very instinct for a mental life on a higher plane.

In spite of the atavistic reversion against the rule now being illustrated by the Teutons, we see our western civilization placing its standards on ideals, on a high moral and spiritual plane. Along with this as a necessary adjunct, we see a decreasing birth-rate, a prolongation of the period of individual preparation, a prolongation of the period of maturity and effective service, a social care for the weaker social units, and an enhanced value on the individual. Looking at the orient in general and China in particular, we see a civilization rooted and defined in the struggle for existence and exhibiting as its necessary corollaries the antithesis of our western ideals. Class and not the individual is exalted, and the loss of eight out of each original ten becomes of no moment.

Drawing together now all the dissimilar threads and divergent strands, is it possible to weave them into one strong cord of consistent solution of the great Chinese problem? By a process of pure induction can we arrive at a sound judgment of the Chinese character? There is a viewpoint which reconciles all the apparent inconsistency and strangeness of the matter and brings some measure of harmony. All those lines of observation which are concerned with the more fundamental reactions of the Chinese mind agree with the results of analytical study of his more complex and remote reactions. This agreement is in effect that the Chinese does not differ essentially from his western brothers. Both are human and endowed with the same variety of human nature. Their psychological reactions are the same in nature. Their anatomy and nervous responses are the same. They react identically to pathological and psychological stimuli. They respond to the same appeals, have the same emotions and discover the same instincts. Given the same surroundings and training, we should act and react as they do. In any given circumstance it is impossible that they should comport themselves differently from the way they do. In other words, the same mental, physical and psychological laws govern the Chinese and the occidental.

But still there is a difference, and if it be not in kind, it must be in degree. Though the races are fundamentally alike, none the less our same data show a degree of difference and divergence which must be accounted for and reconciled to the essential unity. The difference in degree seems evidently to come from the peculiar and unique type of civilization which characterizes China. This civilization in turn is apparently a result of her educational system, and that in turn is based on and goes back to Confucius. Therefore it may be said that on a foundation essentially like the western, Confucianism has built an edifice which is strikingly unlike western or Christian civilization. It is

fair to assume therefore that this civilization and the type of individual associated with it, can not be changed without changing Confucianism. To get down then to the essential unity of the races, to discover the real humanness of the Chinese, he must be divested of the Confucian tradition as of a garment. It is the vesture and not the man which is different. Here comes the civilizing mission of Christianity and its great opportunity.

But this in no wise elucidates the more absolute problem of the relative value of the Chinese as against the western or Christian type of civilization. Other data are necessary for this determination and the bounds of the present discussion do not expand to meet it. The very arguments which we use so far may with similar propriety be employed by the Chinese. That is, the judge of this more ultimate problem must disencumber himself from the blinding influence of nationality, race and hereditary presumption, which of necessity condition ordinary estimates of final values. He must have perspective, and this, if it can not be attained in space, must be attained in time, which means, after all, that time is the only final and ultimate judge of which civilization is the better.